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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND  
1. By letter of April 11, 2012, the OSCE Office in Yerevan asked OSCE/ODIHR to 
conduct a preliminary assessment of the legal framework governing the legislative 
process in Armenia (hereinafter referred to as the “Preliminary Assessment”). This 
request was based on prior discussions between the OSCE Office in Yerevan and 
OSCE/ODIHR on the necessity and benefits of performing an assessment of the law 
making procedure in Armenia. This Preliminary Assessment is based on an analysis of 
the existing legal framework concerning the law making process in Armenia. Its 
purpose is to demonstrate whether the current lawmaking procedure corresponds to 
key standards and OSCE commitments on democratic lawmaking, as part of the 
combined efforts of the OSCE Office in Yerevan and OSCE/ODIHR to provide 
assistance to strengthening and improving this process.  
2. One desired outcome of this Preliminary Assessment could be the initiation of a 
wider, more comprehensive full-scale assessment of the law making procedure and 
practices in Armenia, according to OSCE/ODIHR’s developed methodology. Such a 
full-scale assessment would require an official request from the Armenian authorities, 
and would involve discussions with representatives of the Armenian government and 
legislature, as well as with practitioners and scholars familiar with the Armenian 
legislative practice; this would ensure a thorough analysis of legislation and practice, 
and the formulation of precise practical recommendations. 
SCOPE OF THE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
3. This Preliminary Assessment describes the current constitutional, legal and 
organizational framework for the legislative process in Armenia and analyzes some 
particularly critical aspects. It should not be viewed as a full-fledged ODIHR 
assessment but rather as a starting point to provide assistance to strengthening and 
improving the legislative process in the Republic of Armenia by identifying possible 
weaknesses in the legislative process and suggesting ways in which they may be 
addressed. The Preliminary Assessment is based on an analysis of the Constitution, 
relevant domestic legislation and legal documents1 and is thus based mainly on legal 
texts, not on particular knowledge or experience of the Armenian legislative practice, 
nor on interviews with stakeholders. However, this analysis may already reveal how 
certain procedures are implemented and how key principles are applied.  
4. Additionally, practical issues and possible challenges to the law making process may 
be raised in the Preliminary Assessment, but are not covered in depth, as this would 
transcend the scope of this assessment. Assumptions of possible risks and challenges 
                                           
1
 For examples of such documents, see footnote 2 infra. 
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will stem from international experiences, rather than from direct practical experience 
in Armenia.  
5. The Preliminary Assessment presents a detailed description of the current 
constitutional, legal and organizational framework of the legislative process in 
Armenia. It is, however, limited in scope as not all Armenian laws and secondary 
legislation were taken into account, but only a selection of those laws that were 
considered relevant for the purposes of this assessment. Furthermore, the Preliminary 
Assessment focuses on particularly critical aspects of the legislative process and 
formulates recommendations for possible improvement.  
6. The Preliminary Assessment is based on unofficial English translations; errors from 
translation may consequently result. It is also possible that the amendments of key 
laws that were introduced after September 2012 have not yet been taken into account 
in the English translations.  
7. In view of the above, OSCE/ODIHR would like to mention that this Preliminary 
Assessment is without prejudice to any description, analysis or written and oral 
recommendations and comments to the related legislation and legislative process that 
the OSCE/ODIHR may have the opportunity to make in the future. 
MATERIALS ANALYSED 
8. Apart from various country reports on Armenia2, the Preliminary Assessment is based 
on non-official English translations of the following legal texts: 
o Constitution of the Republic of Armenia of July 5, 1995 (hereinafter, "the 
Constitution") 
o Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, enacted by Law of the Republic 
of Armenia of February 20, 2002 (hereinafter, the "Rules of Procedure") 
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Legal Acts of April 3, 2002 (hereinafter, 
the "Law on Legal Acts") 
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Freedom of Information of September 23, 
2003 
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Parties of July 3, 2002  
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Television and Radio Broadcasting of 
October 9, 2000 
                                           
2
  See “Methodische Anleitung über die Entwicklung von Entwürfen der Rechtsakte”, Republic of Armenia 
Government Programme (Yerevan 2008), Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010, 
European Commission (Brussels, 25/05/2011),  and Country report: Armenia, Supporting Policy, Regulatory 
and Institutional Reforms for Civil Society Development in Armenia: Existing gaps and recommendations, 
Counterpart International's Armenia Representation, USAID. 
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o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Copyright and Related Rights of June 15, 
2006  
o Decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia on the Rules of Procedure 
of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, (hereinafter, "the Rules of 
Government Procedure") 
9. Additionally, the following laws were taken into account: 
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on Referendum of September 12, 20013 , 
hereinafter, the "Law on Referendum") 
o Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Constitutional Court of June 1, 20064 
(hereinafter, “the Law on the Constitutional Court") 
o Judicial Code of the Republic of Armenia of February 21, 20075 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
10. The legislative process in Armenia appears to be quite fast, but at the same time 
highly formalized. The Government remains involved even once the legislative 
process has reached the Parliament. By law, many subject matters need to be regulated 
by primary laws passed by the National Assembly, which means that the National 
Assembly is under a quite high workload. There are many legal and procedural 
requirements that aim to enhance legislative quality. These instruments, however, are 
at times not sufficiently precise and may suffer – as the whole legislative process – 
from rigid time limits. 
11. The Preliminary Assessment identifies six main areas with potential weaknesses in the 
legislative process and recommends the following: 
o The National Assembly may consider amending rules pertaining to deadlines 
in the legislative process, so that time frames become more flexible, and allow 
for extensions. 
o The National Assembly may consider whether in future, a fast-track or 
extended procedure could be put in place for minor or less complex legislation 
respectively. 
                                           
3
 http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1284&lang=eng 
4
 http://www.concourt.am/english/law_cc/index.htm 
5
 http://www.parliament.am/legislation. php?sel=show&ID=2966&lang=eng 
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o The National Assembly and the Government may consider introducing a 
requirement that the explanatory note which must accompany a submitted draft 
law should disclose whether the draft law has been the subject of public 
consultation, and the nature of such consultation. 
o The National Assembly may consider whether Parliamentary Committees 
should be assigned a more active role in shaping legislation. 
o The National Assembly and Government may consider conducting in-depth 
regulatory impact assessments, and civil society consultations on draft laws of 
high importance, e.g. complex or far-reaching subject matters and on specific 
aspects of draft laws. 
o The National Assembly and Government may consider whether there is too 
much focus on primary laws, and too limited possibilities of regulating certain 
topics by secondary legislation. 
12. In terms of the ways in which these risks might be addressed, the Preliminary 
Assessment’s approach is also based on the consideration that any reform should be 
conceived by the Armenian authorities, rather than be handed down by the 
international community, and should be embarked upon only after a full process of 
consultation; only in this way can there be any confidence that the reforms will fit the 
specificities of the local legislative and political cultures. The Preliminary Assessment 
does not therefore make specific recommendations for reform, but rather identifies 
areas where progress is needed.  
 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
13. This Preliminary Assessment outlines a condensed version of the legislative process in 
Armenia, embedded in the constitutional order. It focuses on norms that determine the 
functioning of the legislative process and attempts to provide a brief overview of the 
rules defining the legislative process as a whole. 
14. This Preliminary Assessment is based on written law only. The question of whether 
the law is applied in practice will need to be dealt with in a practical analysis. Possible 
discrepancies between the law and its implementation will then need to be further 
explored, in particular in relation to how they affect the many positive aspects of the 
legislative process in Armenia. One prominent example of this relates to the rule of 
law, which is explicitly guaranteed by the Armenian Constitution and specified in 
many important principles found in other laws (hierarchy of norms, non-retroactivity 
of laws, limitations on delegating legislative power, official publication, judicial 
review etc.).   
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15. To date, some international agencies have made efforts to compile and analyze 
information on the legislative process in Armenia. However, the issue has been 
approached from a thematic angle and there exists a need for a comprehensive 
assessment aimed to promote better legislative efficiency to ensure good quality, and 
enforceable legislation in all fields. In order for ODIHR to conduct a full scale 
assessment, according to its developed methodology6, an official request from the 
Armenian authorities is required, and ODIHR welcomes any such expression of 
interest. A full-scale assessment would necessarily involve re-visiting many issues 
contained in this Report, as well as adherence to ODIHR methodology by way of 
semi-structured field interviews with pre-identified interlocutors, including all 
governmental and parliamentary bodies involved in law-making activities.  The 
purpose of such assessment would be to provide an illustration of the practice in the 
process of law making in the Republic of Armenia and recommendations on 
improving its efficiency and transparency. Discussions with representatives of the 
Armenian authorities as well as with practitioners and scholars familiar with the 
Armenian legislative practice would be necessary for a more thorough analysis and 
especially for the formulation of  precise practical recommendations. 
16. The following remarks highlight areas which may be particularly interesting for 
further analysis. These are areas that are sensitive in any democratic process, and 
where the law appears to sometimes lack clarity, along with other areas that may be of 
general interest for further study. The ensuing remarks are neither strictly distinct from 
one another nor exhaustive; indeed, it is possible that additional questions will arise 
during a practical analysis of the legislative process in Armenia. 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEDURES AND INSTRUMENTS WHEREBY 
LEGISLATION IS PREPARED, DRAFTED, ADOPTED AND PUBLISHED 
17. The following entails a brief overview of the law-making procedure in Armenia. A 
more detailed description of the system, on which the thematic analysis is based, is 
provided in Annex 1. 
18. As the supreme legal instrument of the Republic of Armenia, the Constitution of 
Armenia provides the general legal framework for the legislative process. New 
legislation may be initiated by members of the National Assembly and by the 
Government. When the Government initiates the process, the draft law must be 
accompanied by substantial documentation, including a regulatory impact assessment 
report and civil society consultation. If a member of the National Assembly initiates 
the process, these quality checks are performed after the draft law has passed the first 
reading. 
19. All draft legislation is submitted to the Chairperson of the National Assembly. In 
cases where the Government initiated legislation, the Government can establish the 
                                           
6
 The description of the ODIHR methodology is given in Annex 2. 
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debating procedure; in case changes are introduced by the National Assembly, the 
Government can demand that only those changes that it agrees to will be voted on. 
Draft laws considered urgent by the Government shall be debated and voted on before 
the National Assembly within one month. 
20. Within two days upon submission of a draft law by the Government, it is reviewed by 
relevant parliamentary committees; in case of several committees, the Chairperson of 
the National Assembly designates a Leading Committee. Draft laws initiated by MPs 
are forwarded to the Government and all standing committees for input (which, in the 
case of the Government, shall include a statement on its budgetary implications). If a 
draft law is initiated by one-third of the overall number of MPs, it is automatically 
included in the legislative agenda of the National Assembly.  
21. Standing Committees provide for the preliminary review of draft laws, based on their 
individual rules of procedure, and with the help of sub-committees and working 
groups. The Leading Committee in a given case shall provide for a positive or 
negative evaluation of a draft law initiated by the National Assembly or the 
Government within one month (in urgent cases, this time is shortened to two weeks). 
Once the Leading Committee has returned the draft law, complete with its evaluation, 
to the Chairperson of the National Assembly, the latter will propose to the National 
Assembly to include it in the legislative agenda. Also, all MPs and parliamentary 
committees may forward to the Leading Committee written proposals regarding the 
draft law prior to the 2nd reading.  
22. The first reading of a draft law has the form of an initial debate and does not leave 
room for voting on individual articles; it is mainly a decision on whether the 
legislative process will continue or not. It involves the presentation of the law, and 
statements by the Leading Committee and possibly other committees, followed by a 
debate. At the end of the first reading, based on the proposal of the drafter of the law, 
the majority of the National Assembly may decide to pass the draft law (with 
amendments proposed during the session) in the next (second) reading, or to postpone 
voting for another three days. If the draft law is not voted on at the end of this period, 
then it is considered adopted without voting. 
23. The draft law adopted in the 1st reading shall be sent to the Leading Committee, other 
standing committees, all MPs and the Government within seven days.  Upon receipt, 
MPs and the Government have 14 days to propose amendments, which shall be 
submitted to the National Assembly. 
24. The second reading begins no later than one month after the draft law has passed the 
1st reading. During the second reading, each amendment to the draft law is discussed 
and voted on individually after the entire law is put to vote. A simple majority of the 
members of the National Assembly present is sufficient to pass the draft law. If 
additional amendments are introduced during the second reading, then they are 
included in the text and put to a vote during a third reading of the draft law. At the 
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third reading, the draft law can only undergo formalistic changes, but not substantial 
ones.  
25. Once a draft law has been passed by the National Assembly, the President has 21 days 
to sign and publish it, or he/she may also return the draft law to the National Assembly 
and demand a new debate. Debate and voting will only take place on those provisions 
that the President proposes to change. Any draft law remanded by the President will 
be treated as a priority by the National Assembly, which can accept or reject any or all 
of the President’s suggestions and objections by majority vote. Regardless of whether 
the President’s suggestions/objections are accepted or rejected, the President must 
then sign and publish the adopted draft within five days.  
26. A law enters into force once it is signed by the President and published. Publication 
has to take place within 21 days after the adoption of the draft law by the National 
Assembly.  However, the law itself may specify a later date of entry into force.   
27. The procedure for amending the Constitution is slightly different, as this requires a 
referendum, which can be initiated by the President or the National Assembly. If the 
National Assembly initiates the procedure (which requires a majority vote), then it 
submits draft amendments to the President and requests him/her to initiate the 
referendum. The President may remand the National Assembly’s draft back within 21 
days with his/her suggestions and objections. If the National Assembly reintroduces 
the draft by at least two thirds of the total number of Deputies, the President submits it 
for referendum within the period determined by the National Assembly. 
28. A presidential initiative for a referendum is submitted to the National Assembly, 
which then needs to adopt the draft amendments to the Constitution by majority vote. 
After the adoption, the President submits the draft for referendum on a date set by 
him/her. Draft amendments submitted for referendum are considered passed when 
they receive over fifty per cent of the votes of not less than one fourth of the number 
of registered voters. 
29. Once laws are passed, their constitutionality can be reviewed in abstracto by the 
Constitutional Court. The right to challenge the constitutionality of legislation belongs 
to the President, the Government and MP groups comprising a minimum of one fifth 
of the total vote from the last parliamentary elections. 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
30. The legislative process generally falls within the competences of the Parliament. In 
Armenia, debates and the adoption of laws take place in the National Assembly, a 
democratically elected body. 
31. At the same time, the legislative process appears to be strongly influenced by the 
Government. The Government may propose draft laws, prioritize them in discussion, 
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and prevent discussions on amendments that are not acceptable to the Government. It 
may also combine proposals with a motion of confidence, albeit limited in use. 
32. The Government is appointed by the President after consultation with the National 
Assembly. The President also has a delaying veto on new legislation (and a qualitative 
veto on referendum). He or she may dissolve the National Assembly if the 
Government program is rejected twice by the National Assembly (Article 74.1 par 1 
of the Constitution) or if the National Assembly fails to approve a draft law deemed 
urgent by Government within three months (Article 74.1 par 2a of the Constitution). 
33. The Constitutional Court may invalidate laws that are in violation of the Constitution 
(and possibly also in cases where they are not in compliance with earlier legislation). 
In case of invalidation, individual acts based on that law shall remain in force; 
however, acts on criminal sanctions and administrative liability matters may be 
revisited. Invalidation enters into force immediately after the Constitutional Court 
decision but this may be postponed if severe consequences are expected for the public 
and / or the state. 
34. In sum, while the National Assembly passes most laws, the influence of other bodies 
on the legislative process is quite substantial. This may be perfectly legitimate; 
especially the strong role of Government in the legislative process may provide for 
swift and coherent legislation. There are, however, some concerns that the National 
Assembly (or the opposition parties in the National Assembly) may have too little 
influence on key legislative decisions and that the system of checks and balances 
favors too strongly the President and the Government. Concerning the legislative 
process, one may especially ask whether the National Assembly has sufficient 
resources and knowledge to set the agenda for legislative debate as well as to 
adequately assess the content of the proposed draft laws. This question should be 
evaluated in greater depth on the basis of a practical analysis of the legislative process 
in action. 
PARLIAMENTARY AND GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES 
35. New legislation may be initiated by members of the National Assembly and by the 
Government. When the Government initiates the process, the draft law must be 
accompanied by substantial documentation, notably a report on regulatory impact 
assessment (hereinafter “RIA”), the summary of comments and suggestions made to 
the draft in question by other executives, their acceptance or non-acceptance, with 
substantiation of non-acceptance. The summary shall also include accepted comments 
and suggestions made in the course of civil society consultation. The Government 
must also provide a statement regarding the effects of the new legislation on the state 
budget. 
36. If a member of the National Assembly initiates the process, these quality checks are 
performed after the draft law has passed the first reading. In this case, the draft law 
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shall be accompanied by an explanatory note concerning the adoption of the legal act, 
including information on the necessity to adopt other legal acts in relation to the 
proposed one, as well as proposed amendments to current laws or a note confirming 
that the adoption of additional laws or normative legal acts in connection with the 
legal act in question is not required.  
37. The time limits given to the National Assembly for these quality checks are extremely 
short: five and fifteen days for both RIA and consultation are hardly sufficient, 
assuming that the draft law was not previously publicized and that the consultation 
period is not extended. The Government may have more time than the National 
Assembly to conduct these important checks properly, though this is not indicated in 
the law, which may result in more thorough assessments when draft laws are initiated 
by the Government. 
38. If the situation is as described, then this may lead to two different consequences. The 
legislative process may be typically initiated by Government, which possesses the 
necessary means and time to prepare draft legislation; initiatives of members of the 
National Assembly would then be the exception. Hence, it is possible that the right to 
initiate legislation by members of the National Assembly as written in the Constitution 
is hardly applied in practice. Such a finding may reinforce the questions concerning 
the role of the National Assembly as described before. 
39. It is also possible that parliamentary legislative initiatives are quite common. If so, one 
might ask about the quality of such legislation, especially in light of the above-
mentioned severe time constraints. Additionally, one must further explore the question 
whether members of the National Assembly (or factions or the Assembly as a whole) 
are properly staffed to deal with this task (each member of the National Assembly has 
two aides, as provided by Article 11 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure). These questions 
seem especially important as Committees, typically key actors of the legislative 
process in Parliament, are not mentioned as possible authors of parliamentary 
initiatives. 
40. If indeed parliamentary initiatives for legislation are rare or if there are doubts as to 
their quality (because of a lack of time or lack of means), one should ask further 
whether the National Assembly has the means to oblige the Government to prepare 
and present legislation as requested by the National Assembly; this does not appear to 
be possible under the current constitutional and legal order. Such instruments would 
allow members of Parliament to concentrate on their key functions, i.e. to deliberate 
and to decide key questions related to Armenian legislation without being burdened 
with the details of drafting laws as well. Said instruments could also help reinforce the 
role of the National Assembly in relation to the Government if indeed the concern of 
too little parliamentary influence is confirmed by practical analysis. 
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REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY CONSULTATION 
41. As stated above, draft laws are subject to a RIA, combined with civil society 
consultations. Both take place early in the lawmaking process if the draft law is 
submitted by the Government, but relatively late – namely after the drafting process 
has been completed – if a draft law is submitted by a member of the National 
Assembly. Introducing such quality checks earlier in the legislative process could help 
improve the quality of legislation initiated by members of the National Assembly, e.g. 
if legislation would allow them to conduct a RIA or civil society consultation already 
in relation to a concept note on an intended draft law, if this is supported by a certain 
number of members and/or a parliamentary committee. 
42. Also, it seems that RIA and civil society consultations are required for every change in 
legislation, at least there are no visible exceptions in the relevant law (Article 27.1 of 
the Law on Legal Acts). The prescribed time limits are demanding, to say the least. If 
RIA, conducted under substantial time pressure, is indeed a legal necessity for every 
draft law (and possibly for all later amendments of that law), this could possibly lead 
to inadequate results. Typically, if such instruments are used too often and only 
superficially, their value might be compromised. 
43. Hence, it may be useful to analyze the practical value of these instruments. To this 
end, it is recommended to study the frequency of RIA and civil society consultations. 
Selected RIAs should be subject to a quality check. Regarding civil society 
consultations, an assessment should be done as to whether there is substantial and 
representative participation by various stakeholders in practice. It is also 
recommended to examine how the consultations are arranged and conducted and 
whether the input provided through public consultation processes is reflected, when 
appropriate, in the final draft through a transparent process. More specifically, the 
impact of both RIA and public consultations on proposed legislation should be 
studied, in particular the practical relevance of these tools, by comparing the versions 
of the draft laws before and after the RIA and public consultations were conducted. 
TIME LIMITS 
44. The parliamentary process is characterized by many time limits, which seem to 
usually be quite short, as pointed out in relation to RIA and civil society consultation. 
In general, the circulation of draft laws, as well as the deliberation and voting 
processes in Parliament, are likewise subject to tight schedules. 
45. Sometimes, the law attaches legal consequences to the failure to comply with an 
obligation in time, e.g. the rule that a draft law proposed by an MP shall have no 
budgetary effect if the Government fails to raise this issue in time (Article 51 par 4 of 
the Rules of Procedure). In rare instances, the law stipulates the possibility of 
postponing the voting, e.g. at the end of the first reading of a draft law (Article 64 
par 2 of the Rules of Procedure) or concerning the schedule of the second reading 
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(Article 67 par 5 of the Rules of Procedure). However, in most cases the law does not 
provide for an extension of the given time limit, nor does it elucidate the consequences 
of non-observance of the time limit. 
46. The legal consequences of not respecting time limits are thus in many cases not clear. 
It would, however, be important to specify these whenever possible. Also, if 
extensions of deadlines are permitted in practice but not in the respective laws, then 
these laws should be amended and clarified in that respect. 
47. If time limits are observed as strictly as laid down in law, it should be asked whether 
e.g. standing committees– which typically play an important role in shaping the 
outcome of plenary debates – have sufficient time to consider a draft law. More 
generally, practical analysis should focus on the question of whether such time 
constraints have a negative influence on the legislative process. Especially in the case 
of complex legislation, a meaningful debate in the National Assembly based on solid 
preparation by its members appears to be extremely difficult under such time 
constraints. 
48. Another question that bears mentioning in this context is whether the vast amount of 
short time limits prevents the National Assembly from prioritizing urgent and/or 
important legislative projects. If every draft is subjected to the same tight schedule, the 
working process in the National Assembly will be basically controlled by the influx of 
legislative initiatives – instead of vice versa. 
SECOND READING 
49. In the National Assembly, the key debate on legislation takes place in the second 
reading. It is in the second reading where proposals and changes to draft laws are 
submitted and voted on. The second reading constitutes the essence of parliamentary 
debate in plenary session. 
50. It should be analyzed to what extent proposals to change the draft legislation may be 
excluded from the debate by law, and to which extent they are excluded in practice. In 
the plenary session, there is a comprehensive debate on parliamentary initiatives, but 
the debate on draft legislation proposed by the Government is restricted, since the 
Government may decide to only admit such amendments as are acceptable to it. This 
may constitute a critical limitation of the rights of the legislator, especially if the laws 
discussed in the National Assembly are typically introduced by the Government. 
Generally, conducting debates on the substance of new laws is the role of the 
Parliament. If, in contrast, a Parliament may only say yes or no to new legislation 
(comparable to a popular referendum), its functions are severely curtailed. 
51. It is also questionable whether second and third readings involving an extensive 
exchange of draft laws, opinions and recommendations are necessary for every draft 
law or whether an abrogated procedure would not suffice for minor changes to 
existing legislation. On the other hand, complex legislation of high importance (e.g. a 
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new Criminal Procedure Code or a new pension system regulation) may not undergo 
sufficient parliamentary debate if all remarks and proposals concerning such 
legislation must be introduced and listed before the second reading. There may be a 
need for a "free" debate or a conceptual debate before a draft law is even submitted to 
the National Assembly; the latter may help to prevent stillborn legislation. 
52. The information list described in the Law on Legal Acts is an important step in 
creating new legislation. This is a list of proposals attached to the draft law in 
question, complete with the drafter’s opinion on the proposals. It helps to structure the 
debate in the second reading. However, the main exchange of opinions takes place 
between the author of the law and the Leading Committee. It is unclear how a Deputy 
of the National Assembly should proceed if proposals to the draft law included in the 
information list form the basis for further changes to the draft law, since in this case, 
there appears to be no possibility for the Deputy to revisit the list and add further 
proposals with regard to amended versions of the draft law. As the debate in plenary 
session is limited to items on the information list, such proposals cannot be submitted 
if the author of the draft law does not include them in his or her version. 
53. Finally, one might ask whether the role of the Leading Committee in the second 
reading – and in the overall process – is not too reactive, and, more specifically, 
whether parliamentary committees should not be permitted to also initiate legislation. 
It may enhance the overall process if committees could request additional information 
on draft legislation from the Government, possibly also commission a new RIA on a 
substantial change in a draft law, or if they would be able to initiate civil society 
consultations on a specific question brought up late in the legislative process. If the 
National Assembly wishes to strengthen its role in relation to the Government, it 
would be well advised to strengthen the role of the parliamentary committees. 
REFERENDUM 
54. Whereas most parts of the pieces of Armenian legislation considered for this 
Preliminary Assessment are well-defined and unambiguous, a relatively high amount 
of questions and uncertainties exist with respect to the referendum process. A 
referendum on a law can be initiated by the National Assembly or by the Government. 
The Government may introduce a referendum on its own draft law only with the 
consent of the National Assembly. There is no reciprocal requirement that a call for a 
referendum by the National Assembly requires the consent of the Government.  
55. Time-wise, the referendum is possible after the draft law has been approved by the 
National Assembly. In case of a presidential veto against the referendum, the National 
Assembly may overcome it with the qualified majority of votes. However, the 
procedure appears to be similar to the one of the presidential veto against draft laws; a 
decision of the National Assembly on a referendum may only take place after the third 
reading of the law, but not on a law remanded to the National Assembly by the 
President. The National Assembly may insist on a referendum by two thirds of the 
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total number of deputies of the National Assembly. A draft law passes the referendum 
when it receives over 50% of the votes by more than one fourth of the registered 
voters. The outcome of the referendum is subject to appeal to the Constitutional Court. 
56. These matters may well be obvious to the Armenian state representatives and scholars. 
If not, it would be advisable to make the provisions pertaining to this process as 
precise as possible. Presumably, popular referendum typically take place in a 
politically tense atmosphere; controversies on the procedure may well erupt into a 
constitutional crisis, especially as the mandate of the Constitutional Court may not 
cover these conflicts, as, according to law, it only rules on the outcome of referendum 
(Article 100 par 3 of the Constitution). Hence, further analysis should go into the 
questions raised in relation to the referendum process. 
EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
57. Depending on the actual practice, the scope of constitutional judicial review may be 
quite extensive and may include basic legal principles as well as fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. It seems less clear whether the infringement of one 
law by another law may lead to invalidation of the latter. Such a conflict may 
especially arise in respect to the many rules in the Law of the Republic of Armenia on 
Legal Acts of April 3, 2002. One may argue that the rule of law, outlined in Article 1 
of the Constitution implicates such a review; especially as many important aspects of 
legality are encompassed in the Law on Legal Acts, such as the hierarchy of norms or 
the delegation of legislative powers. However, a review of a law in respect to all 
existing legislation may open a wide field of invalidation, especially as older 
legislation prevails over newer legislation, as stipulated by Article 24 par 3 of the Law 
on Legal Acts. 
58. If indeed all regulations in conflict with the Law on Legal Acts may potentially, if 
they are newer laws, be invalidated, the path to viable new legislation may be 
restricted, hence blocking necessary regulation. It would be helpful to analyze whether 
this concern is justified by pertinent case law of the Constitutional Court. However, if 
the Constitutional Court exercises a certain – typical – restraint, no practical problems 
are to be expected in this respect.  
HIERARCHY OF NORMS  
59. The Armenian legislative system gives priority to laws passed earlier over more recent 
legal norms. This concept forces the legislator to consider possible overlaps with other 
laws when drafting, debating and adopting legislation; also, in order for new 
legislation to really change the legal situation, all relevant older laws must be 
amended accordingly. 
60. This system has the obvious advantage that it forces the legislator to be more careful 
when adopting new laws. In this respect, the relevant provisions are clearly superior to 
clauses found in other legal systems, such as, e.g. "all existing norms not in 
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compliance with this law are null and void". The careful insertion of amendments into 
existing legislation is key to ensuring legal certainty. 
61. One might ask, however, whether problems arise when the legislator simply overlooks 
an existing rule; in consequence, the new rule, which might be important, will not 
apply if it contradicts an older rule. There are exceptions to this rule, such as 
Article 24 par 9 of the Law on Legal Acts attributing priority of a more detailed rule 
over a more general rule, and Article 24 par 7 of the Law on Legal Acts attributing 
priority of a more beneficial over a less beneficial rule. However, the legal questions 
arising from this system may be quite complex. Further analysis should show whether 
such problems also exist in practice. 
LEGISLATIVE STYLE 
62. In the course of this Preliminary Assessment, only a fraction of the existing Armenian 
legislation has been considered. A first impression finds that legislation appears to set 
high standards for legislative drafting. The terms used in legal texts are coherent; 
rigorous logic is applied whenever possible (e.g. when describing the hierarchy of 
laws in Article 24 of the Law on Legal Acts and Article 8 seq. of the Law on Legal 
Acts). The legal texts consulted provide information on different aspects of the law-
making process considered in this Preliminary Assessment, and certain exceptions 
have been noted (e.g. the procedure of the second reading according to Article 67 of 
the Rule of Procedure or the norms on referendum).  
63. The legal texts are likewise very dense. As pointed out before, this helps to answer 
many potential questions concerning the legislative process. However, dense 
legislative texts tend to be overburdened with details (see e.g., Article 21 par 8 of the 
Rule of Procedure (italics added): "The Staff shall provide the Standing Committees 
with the acts, adopted by the President of the Republic, by the National Assembly, by 
the Government, by the Constitutional Court, and with the newspapers of the Republic 
of Armenia".) Some are probably superfluous, such as Article 55 par 7 of the Rule of 
Procedure: "If there is a break during the discussion of the subject, the discussion shall 
be taken further after the break from the point it was interrupted", or Article 67 par 2 
of the Rules of Procedure: "The amendments to the draft law or the package of drafts 
shall be made in the font different from the font of the text of the draft". Such details 
make legislation difficult to read and quite rigid; e.g. in case of technological changes, 
many details of internet publication will need to be amended. It is also possible that 
practice will simply find new ways of operating, which means that the law will no 
longer be applied in all its details anymore.  
64. Dense legislation is also prone to be contradictory in some points. When preparing 
this Preliminary Assessment, it was at times difficult to analyze those areas that are 
regulated by more than one law or by more than one provision of the same law (one 
example for this is what exactly happens after the first reading of a law has taken 
place). 
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65. Practical analysis should go into the question of whether the problems described 
above seriously affect the Armenian legal system in a negative manner or whether 
practice easily copes with the high density of legislation.  
SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
66. The law reserves many fields of public and private life for legislative activity. This 
reinforces the democratic legitimacy of regulation. However, it may also overburden 
the legislator. Practical analysis should go into the question of whether legislative 
power is delegated in practice, especially in light of Article 9 par 4.1 of the Law on 
Legal Acts stating that all questions regarding the exercise of rights of natural and 
legal persons shall only be regulated by law. If such delegation does not take place (or 
is very limited), the actual workload of the legislator might need to be subjected to 
further scrutiny. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE ARMENIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
67. When analyzing the Armenian legislative process purely based on legislative and legal 
sources, as happened in this Preliminary Assessment, the general impression is that 
within the National Assembly, this process is swift, but highly formalized. There are 
many rules that impose deadlines. The Government remains involved in the legislative 
process in the National Assembly, by being able to respond to parliamentary 
initiatives and as the "author" of draft laws. It is possible that the majority of laws 
stem from governmental initiatives. 
68. Many areas of regulation are reserved for laws; this is confirmed by the relatively high 
density of legal norms used for this analysis. The workload in the National Assembly 
is possibly quite high – which would explain the need for a highly formalized process.  
69. The Armenian legal sources correctly acknowledge the importance of the preparatory 
work for draft laws. There are many requirements aiming to enhance legislative 
quality. The laws also foresee quality checks within the Government and between the 
National Assembly and the Government. RIA and civil society consultations are 
prescribed by law. These instruments, however, are not focused on particular areas of 
importance but apply to all laws and may suffer – same as the legislative process as a 
whole – from rigid time limits. 
70. While taking into consideration the possibility of potentially different outcomes when 
assessing the lawmaking practice (as opposed to only the legal framework), and 
possible misunderstandings due to translation errors, one may condense this picture 
and the preliminary remarks made beforehand to the ensuing five primary 
recommendations. 
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TIME LIMITS 
71. The National Assembly may consider rendering the deadlines in the legislative 
process more flexible. If every draft law within the National Assembly needs to be 
completed within the same – short – time limit and hence has the same importance, 
the National Assembly may have difficulties prioritizing those draft laws that it 
considers urgent and/or significant. The rules of procedures should provide the 
possibility of extending time limits, and should prescribe consequences if the 
deadlines are not met. 
ABROGATED OR EXTENDED PROCEDURE 
72. The National Assembly may consider whether the same legislative procedure is 
appropriate for every draft law. If indeed the Armenian legislator is very active, it is 
questionable whether three readings and an extensive exchange of drafts, comments 
and opinions are necessary in all cases. If a draft is of minor importance and is 
undisputed in substance, an abrogated procedure may be considered. On the other 
hand, the use of further parliamentary instruments may be considered for highly 
complex legislation. A "free" debate on a draft law or a conceptual discussion 
beforehand may help MPs concentrate on key questions and may prevent extensive 
legal drafting that will not survive a debate in the National Assembly. 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES 
73. The National Assembly may consider whether parliamentary committees should be 
assigned a more active role in shaping legislation, especially whether parliamentary 
committees may initiate legislation and whether they may request additional 
information on draft legislation from the Government. Under the current system, 
committees play a (possibly important but) mainly reactive role. If the National 
Assembly wishes to strengthen its role vis-à-vis the Government, experiences from 
other European countries show that it could do so best by strengthening the role of the 
parliamentary committees. 
FOCUSING ON REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
CONSULTATION 
74. The National Assembly and Government may consider focusing on in-depth RIA and 
civil society consultations only with regard to draft laws of high importance and those 
regulating specific aspects of a draft law. The current application of these instruments 
seems too broad. A more focused use of these tools may increase the quality and the 
effectiveness of RIA and civil society consultations. If a focused application is 
envisaged, the law should specify the procedure for selecting draft laws for 
submission to RIA and civil society consultations and which aspects of a draft law 
should be subjected to an in-depth RIA. 
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FOCUSING LEGISLATION 
75. The National Assembly and Government may consider whether laws (primary 
legislation) are indeed reserved for "the most significant, typical and stable social 
relations" (Article 9 par 3 Law on Legal Acts) or whether its use is too extensive. 
Currently, legal provisions require a wide range of topics to be regulated by law (see 
Article 9 par 4 of the Law on Legal Acts) and foresee only limited possibilities of 
delegation to secondary legislation. It is, of course, fully understood that measures 
delegating certain topics to secondary legislation must give due consideration to the 
rule of law and constitutional requirements, particular when restricting fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
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ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEDURES AND INSTRUMENTS WHEREBY LEGISLATION IS 
PREPARED, DRAFTED, ADOPTED AND PUBLISHED 
 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
1.1  Overview 
 
1. The above overview depicts the basic political institutions and their interaction. 
Roughly speaking, the political system can be described as a presidential system, with 
similarities to the system in place in France. Many interactions between the National 
Assembly and the Government are orchestrated and overseen by the President. The 
Constitutional Court bears resemblance to the US Supreme Court, being composed of 
nine members and endowed with powers of full constitutional review (see infra 
pars. 56-60). 
2. The citizens' main basis for democratic participation is their right to elect the President 
and the members of the National Assembly over a five years’ period, as envisaged in 
Articles 50 par 1 and 60 par 2 of the Constitution. Furthermore, referendum is 
mandatory for constitutional amendments (Article 111 of the Constitution) and 
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possible for laws upon request of the National Assembly or the Government (Article 
112 of the Constitution.). 
1.2 The President 
3. The President appoints the Prime Minister and the Government. Article 55 par 4 of the 
Constitution envisages that the President "shall, on the basis of the distribution of the 
seats in the National Assembly and consultations held with the parliamentary factions, 
appoint as Prime Minister the person enjoying confidence of the majority of the 
Deputies and if this is impossible, the President of the Republic shall appoint as the 
Prime Minister the person enjoying confidence of the maximum number of the 
Deputies". The President appoints the other Ministers based on recommendations of 
the Prime Minister. 
4. The President may dissolve the National Assembly if it fails to approve the program 
of the Government twice within two months (Article 55 par 3 of the Constitution in 
conjunction with Article 74.1 of the Constitution). He or she may also dissolve the 
National Assembly on recommendation of its Chairman or the Government if it fails 
“to resolve on a draft law deemed urgent by the Government” or in other cases of 
inactivity (Article 74.1 par 2a of the Constitution). Dissolution is prohibited during a 
state of martial law or state of emergency, or once an impeachment procedure has 
been initiated against the President (Article 63 par 3 of the Constitution). 
1.3 The National Assembly 
5. The National Assembly is composed of 131 members and is elected for five years 
(Article 63 pars 1 and 2 of the Constitution). Members of the National Assembly work 
on a full-time basis (Article 65 of the Constitution). They may only be accused of a 
crime or detained with the consent of the National Assembly, unless caught in the act 
of committing a crime (Article 66 pars 3 and 4 of the Constitution). 
6. The National Assembly passes laws and resolutions by majority vote, provided that 
half of the members have participated in voting (Article 71 of the Constitution; some 
exceptions are provided in Article 111 of the Constitution for the procedures for 
adopting  and amending the constitution). The laws passed by the National Assembly 
may be subject to a presidential veto which may be overcome by the National 
Assembly with the majority votes of the total number of Deputies (Article 72 par 1 of 
the Constitution). 
7. The National Assembly also oversees budget execution and usage of loans received 
from foreign countries and international organizations (Article 77 par 1 of the 
Constitution, for the indirect supervision via the Control Chamber, an independent 
budgetary oversight body, see Article 83 par 4 of the Constitution). It may submit 
questions to the Government and express its lack of confidence in the Government 
with a majority vote of the total number of members (Articles 80 and 84 par 1 of the 
Constitution).  
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1.4 The Government 
8. The Government shall "develop and implement the domestic policy" (Article 85 par 1 
and Article 89 pars 4-7 of the Constitution). It submits its “program” to the National 
Assembly for approval (Article 89 par 1 of the Constitution; see also Article 74.1 of 
the Constitution for possible consequences of repeated rejection7) and appoints 
regional governors (Article 88.1 par 1 of the Constitution). 
9. The major functions of the Government are defined in Article 75 of the Constitution. 
It is authorized to propose legislation, it may "determine the sequence of the debate 
for its proposed legislation and may demand that they be voted only with amendments 
acceptable to it". It may also put forward a motion of confidence in conjunction with 
proposed legislation; the draft law will then be deemed accepted unless one third of 
the total number of members of the National Assembly bring forward a draft motion 
of non-confidence within twenty-four hours. This procedure may only be applied 
twice during each session of the National Assembly. 
10. The Government is led by the Prime Minister (see Articles 86 and 87 of the 
Constitution), who is appointed by the President on the basis of support by the 
National Assembly (Article 55 par 4 of the Constitution, see supra par 3). The 
President also appoints the other ministers on recommendation of the Prime Minister 
(Article 55 par 4 subpar 2 of the Constitution; see Article 85 par 3 of the Constitution 
for the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister). 
1.5 The Constitutional Court 
11. The Constitutional Court is a specialized court for constitutional review. It enjoys full 
independence (Article 94 par 1 and Article 87 of the Constitution). Its nine members 
are elected by the National Assembly (five members) and by the President (four 
members). They may not be removed and hold their office until the age of 65 
(Article 96 of the Constitution).  
12. The Court "shall administer the constitutional justice" (Article 93 of the Constitution, 
see Article 100 of the Constitution for a more detailed list of tasks), and determines 
the constitutionality of laws (see infra pars 56-60). 
                                           
7
 Article 74.1 of the Constitution vests the President with the right to dissolve the National Assembly if the latter 
fails to approve the Government’s program twice in succession within two months. The National Assembly 
may also be dissolved upon the recommendation of the Chairman of the National Assembly or the Prime 
Minister if the National Assembly fails within three months to resolve on the draft law deemed urgent by the 
Government’s decision or in case when during the session no sittings were convened for more than three 
months or the National Assembly fails to adopt a resolution on issues under debate for more than three 
months..  
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2. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: LAWS 
2.1 Definitions 
13. The definitions of laws and other legal acts, as well as many of their material and 
procedural requirements are to be found in the Law of the Republic of Armenia on 
Legal Acts of April 3, 2002 (hereafter, “the Law on Legal Acts”). It defines "laws" as 
a subcategory of legal acts, stemming from the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Armenia (Article 4 par 1 and Article 9 par 1 of the Law on Legal Acts, in conjunction 
with the Article 62 of the Constitution). According to Article 2 par 2 of the Law on 
Legal Acts, a law must be normative (in contrast to individual and internal legal acts), 
meaning that it must contain at least one legal norm. The term legal norm itself is 
defined in Article 2 par 4 of the Law on Legal Acts as a "rule of conduct adopted by 
the people of the Republic of Armenia, state or local self-government bodies within 
the scope of their authority and in cases established by law and pursuant to procedure 
established by this Law, which is of temporary or permanent character, is designed for 
one-time or repeated application and is mandatory for everyone or selected categories 
or persons (but not selected individuals)." Laws may have the form of codes, which 
“in a systematized and structured fashion states all or fundamental norms of the law 
regulating similar social relations” (see Article 9 par 5 of the Law on Legal Acts). 
14. A law may concern any legal relations but is designed to "regulate the most 
significant, typical and stable social relations" (Article 9 pars 1 and 3 of the Law on 
Legal Acts). As a concrete expression of the principle of the rule of law guaranteed in 
Article 1 of the Constitution, only laws may restrict constitutional rights (under certain 
strict conditions, see Article 43 of the Constitution8). More specifically, Article 9 
par 4 of the Law on Legal Acts lists areas which may be regulated only by law such as 
restrictions on rights and freedoms of natural and legal persons, including taxes, 
business regulation, sanctions and liabilities, elections and referendum, state spending, 
political parties, and the federal organization. Delegation of powers is possible under 
the premises of Article 9 par 4.1 of the Law on Legal Acts (see infra par 60 seq.). 
15. Article 3 of the Law on Legal Acts provides that a law as a legal act must satisfy 
various general requirements such as public adoption by the competent body as well 
as respect of the hierarchy of norms and of legislative technique. All laws are subject 
to drafting principles and quality measures (Articles 26-45 of the Law on Legal Acts). 
The law – as any state action – must be in accordance with basic constitutional 
principles such as the rule of law (Articles 1 and 5 of the Constitution), equal 
protection and respect of human dignity (Articles 14 and 14.1 of the Constitution), 
judicial protection (Article 18 of the Constitution), and respect of fundamental human 
                                           
8
  Article 43 of the Constitution provides that certain fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms may be 
temporarily restricted only by the law “if it is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public order, crime prevention, protection of public health and morality, constitutional rights and 
freedoms, as well as honor and reputation of others” and that these limitations may not exceed the scope 
defined by the international commitments assumed by Armenia. 
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and civil rights vested in the Constitution as well as in international treaties (Article 43 
pars 1 and 2 of the Constitution). The law must also be in compliance with customary 
international law (Article 21 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts).  
16. In the hierarchy of legal acts, laws are second in line, being inferior to the Constitution 
only. All other legal acts must comply with the laws (Article 8 par 2 subpar 2 of the 
Law on Legal Acts). Within the category of laws, laws adopted by referendum (see 
infra par 47-53) are higher in hierarchy than ordinary laws (Article 24 par 6 of the 
Law on Legal Acts) and may only be amended by a new referendum (Article 112 
par 2 of the Constitution). 
17. In cases where laws of equal standing conflict, the older law prevails over the newer 
one (Article 24 par 3 of the Law on Legal Acts). A newer law, however, may establish 
an exception from a more general rule (lex specialis) (Article 24 par 9 of the Law on 
Legal Acts). In its application by state and municipal authorities, the newer law also 
prevails over the older one if it is more beneficial for natural or legal persons 
(Article 24 par 7 of the Law on Legal Acts). Retroactive effect of new legislation is 
likewise permissible when improving the legal status of an individual (see Article 78 
of the Law on Legal Acts). 
2.2 Legal Initiative 
18 The right to initiate the legislative process is vested in the National Assembly and in 
the Government (Article 75 par 1 of the Constitution and Article 47 par 1 of Law of 
the Republic of Armenia on the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of 
February 20, 2002 (hereafter, “the Rules of Procedure), see also Article 48 of the 
Rules of Procedure). The legal sources do not mention parliamentary committees as 
possible initiators of law. 
19 The decision-making process within the Government before submitting a draft law is 
subject to the Rules of Procedure of the Government of the Republic of Armenia 
(hereafter, “the Rules of Government Procedure”). Resolutions of Government are 
adopted by a simple majority of the Ministers (Article 49 of the Rules of Government 
Procedure), with a casting vote of the Prime Minister if necessary. 
20 Draft laws (or a package of draft laws) must be submitted to the Chairperson of the 
National Assembly (Article 50 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure), by the initiator, 
whether it is the Government or a Deputy of the National Assembly. Article 47 pars 4 
and 5 of the Rules of Procedure provide that if submitted by a Deputy, the draft law 
shall be accompanied by a “substantiating note” (presumably an explanatory note) 
concerning the adoption of the legal act, including information on the necessity to 
adopt other legal acts in relation to the proposed one, as well as proposed amendments 
to current laws or a note confirming that the adoption of additional laws or normative 
legal acts in connection with the legal act in question is not required. Further materials 
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and the names of the drafters are optional (Article 47 par 4 subpar 2 subpar 1 of the 
Rules of Procedure9). 
21 In addition to the above-mentioned materials, the Government must provide for a 
regulatory impact assessment (Article 47 par 4 subpar 1 (3) of the Rules of Procedure; 
see par 29) and "a summary sheet of comments and suggestions concerning the draft 
in question, its acceptance or non-acceptance [of these comments and suggestions by 
the drafters], with substantiation of non-acceptance; the summary sheet shall also 
include accepted comments and suggestions made in the course of civil society 
consultation" (Article 47 par 4 subpar 1 (4) of the Rules of Procedure). These rules are 
lex specialis to the more general provisions in Article 28 of the Law on Legal Acts 
specifying which documents shall be supplied along with draft normative legal acts. 
Government must also provide a statement regarding the effects of the new legislation 
on the state budget (Article 50 par 3c of the Rules of Procedure). 
22 A special procedure applies if the Government combines legislation with a motion of 
confidence in the Government. The legislative process is then abrogated in so far that 
if the National Assembly does not immediately propose a motion of no confidence, 
submitted by no less than one third of the total number of Deputies and subsequently 
supported by more than half of the total number of Deputies (Article 75 par 4 and 
Article 84 par 1 of the Constitution), then the governmental legislative draft is 
considered adopted. Further discussion in the National Assembly will not take place; 
the law is directly forwarded to the President for signing (see supra par 9); it might be 
asked what role the National Assembly plays when the President executes his or her 
veto powers. This procedure may be applied only twice during a session in the 
National Assembly (Article 75 par 5 of the Constitution). 
23 The "legal initiative" is the beginning of the legislative process within the National 
Assembly. The requirements in Article 47 of the Rules of Procedure make it clear that 
preparatory work must be done by members of the National Assembly as well as of 
the Government before submitting a draft law; an initiative requires a formulated 
proposal. A right to initiate the legislative process with an unformulated proposal or a 
concept note (see Article 27 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts) requesting the 
preparation of a draft by the Government or Parliamentary committees or staff is not 
possible (such a request may not be made in the form of a resolution, see Article 52 of 
the Rules of Procedure).  
2.3  Drafting and Preparatory Work 
24 Drafting and preparatory work are regulated in Articles 26-45 of the Law on Legal 
Acts. Article 26 of the Law on Legal Acts reads that legislative drafting takes place 
within the framework of normative legal act drafting plans adopted by the 
                                           
 
9
 The structure of Article 47 of the Rules of Procedure seems not to be fully coherent in the translated version; 
other paragraphs or subparagraphs may apply. 
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Government and by the National Assembly – not precluding legislation not included 
in the plan; plans exist for the short (1-2 years) and the long term (3 and more years). 
25 There are no procedural rules on how a Deputy of the National Assembly shall 
prepare a draft law. The process within the Government is regulated mainly in 
Articles 18 and 19 of the Rules of Government Procedure. Draft laws are submitted 
for the Government's consideration through Ministers or Deputy Ministers (Article 11 
of the Rules of Government Procedure), encompassing basically the materials 
necessary to submit the draft to the National Assembly (Articles 11 and 18 of the 
Rules of Government Procedure). Before being introduced to the Government, the 
draft law must be submitted for comments and objections to the stakeholder Ministers 
and the Minister of Justice (Article 18 of the Rules of Government Procedure Error! 
Reference source not found.). 
26 Complex legislation requires a concept note (Article 27 par 2 of the Law on Legal 
Acts). Article 27 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts provides that it "shall contain a 
description of the relations subject to regulation and the objectives of the act to be 
drafted, key provisions thereof, analyze the expected consequences of application of 
the provisions to be drafted, and may include a tentative structure of the legal act". 
The concept note is an internal document for the drafters, and is not subject to 
approval by political bodies or experts. 
27 Drafting is subject to the rules of legislative technique according to Articles 36-45 of 
the Law on Legal Acts. They encompass – inter alia –"clear, exact and accessible 
language" (Article 36 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts), a structure of chapters, articles 
and paragraphs (Article 37.1 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts), a concluding part 
containing a list of other legal acts to be amended or terminated (Article 37.3 par 3 of 
the Law on Legal Acts, see also Article 24 par 3 of the Law on Legal Acts), proper 
citation, and the avoidance of unnecessary repetition (Articles 39 and 45 par 1-2 of the 
Law on Legal Acts). Laws may not stipulate rules that cannot be implemented or 
where there are no legal consequences for non-implementation (Article 45 par 3 of the 
Law on Legal Acts). 
28 Drafting work may be assigned to third parties or to several institutions by competitive 
procedure (Article 27 pars 3 and 4 of the Law on Legal Acts): the lawmaking body 
may delegate preparation of alternative legal drafts to external legal or natural persons 
by announcing a call for bids for the winning draft. Funding and public procurement 
required for such delegation are regulated in Article 30 of the Law on Legal Acts. 
Anybody may submit a draft law and may participate in the further debate if the draft 
law is properly brought into the legislative process by the Government or a member of 
the National Assembly (Article 27 par 5 of the Law on Legal Acts). 
29 A draft law is subject to several quality checks. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) 
is provided for in Article 27.1 of the Law on Legal Acts. It is defined as "the analysis 
of potential changes resulting from the adoption of a normative legal act, and in the 
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case of a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Armenia ". A RIA report 
must contain the model applied, a timeline of anticipated consequences, and 
comparative statistical analysis. 
30 RIA is conducted by "national executive authorities as determined by the 
Government". The RIA focuses on "estimated administration-related expenditures on 
the part of natural and legal persons in the area of the environment, social welfare, 
health care, economy, including small and medium businesses, anti-trust, anti-
corruption, and budget". Further areas may be analyzed by the drafting body or third 
parties. 
31 Governmental draft laws are subjected to RIA before submission to the National 
Assembly (Article 47 par 4 subpar 1 (3) of the Rules of Procedure) and draft laws 
initiated by Deputies after the first reading in the National Assembly (RIA via 
Government opinion, Article 27.1 par 1 subpar 2 of the Law on Legal Acts). RIA must 
be conducted within fifteen days (or five days in case the draft law has been adopted 
in first reading (Article 27.1 par 3 of the Law on Legal Acts)). It seems that every 
draft law is subject to RIA, irrespective of its importance. 
32 Also – as part of the RIA process under Article 27.1 of the Law on Legal Acts – civil 
society consultation of the draft is provided for in par 4 of this provision. Such 
consultation takes place simultaneously to the RIA and is designed to "raise awareness 
of natural and legal persons on the draft normative legal act, as well as collecting 
opinions and developing on their basis […] requisite revisions to the draft normative 
legal act". The draft law and related materials are published on the internet; 
stakeholder meetings, polls etc. are possible. The consultation process must last a 
minimum of fifteen days. 
33 Articles 31 and 32 of the Law on Legal Acts provide for expert legal evaluation of a 
draft law by the Ministry of Justice. Legal evaluation means compliance with the 
Constitution and other legal acts. It takes place after the first reading of the law in the 
National Assembly if the law is submitted for opinion to the Government or after 
adoption if the law is sent to the President for signature. In conducting the review, the 
Ministry of Justice "shall enjoy independence and be guided solely by law". Expert 
legal opinion has an (important) advisory function; only the Constitutional Court may 
formally declare laws unconstitutional and void. Linguistic evaluations as well as 
other topical forms of evaluation are optional. 
2.4 First Reading 
34 A draft law properly initiated within the National Assembly must be addressed to the 
Chairperson of the National Assembly who will within a two-day period forward the 
draft to the Committees of the National Assembly, the parliamentary factions and 
MPs’ groups as well as the Government, unless the Government is the author of the 
law (Article 51 pars 1a-1c of the Rules of Procedure). The Chairperson will forward a 
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draft law if it is in compliance with Article 47 of the Rules of Procedure, as the power 
to circulate draft laws is vested in the Presidency of the Parliament (Articles 18 par 1a 
and 50 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure; see also Articles 28 and 31 of the Rules of 
Government Procedure for the relevant internal governmental procedure). The draft 
law can also be submitted electronically (Article 50 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure). 
35 The role of a "preliminary review of draft legal acts" is conferred to the committees by 
the Constitution (Article 73 par 2 of the Constitution). Each draft law is assigned to 
one Leading Committee. The number of standing committees is limited to twelve 
(Article 73 par 1 of the Constitution). In the committees, the political composition 
"must reflect the quantitative ratio of factions, deputy groups and other Deputies not 
included in a faction or a group” (Article 25 par 2 of the Rules of Procedure). 
Committees have one secretary and three experts (Article 21 par 7 of the Rules of 
Procedure). Their rules of procedure are regulated in Articles 26-29 of the Rules of 
Procedure.  
36 The Chairperson of the National Assembly appoints the Leading Committee (Articles 
30 and 51 par 1b of the Rules of Procedure) which shall make an interfacing report by 
rendering the conclusion of the Committee on the considered draft law; it shall submit 
its conclusions within thirty days of receipt of the draft law, but not before it has 
received the Government’s and National Assembly staff’s conclusions (possibly 
including conclusions on budgetary effects).  
37 The National Assembly staff are held to submit these reports within twenty days after 
having received a Deputy's draft law (Article 51 pars 1a, 1b and 3 of the Rules of 
Procedure). The report of the Leading Committee must be available at least two hours 
before the beginning of a four-day plenary session (Article 51 par 7 of the Rules of 
Procedure). 
38 The author of the draft law may participate in the debate in the Committee (Article 28 
par 4 of the Rules of Procedure). Members of Parliament may submit proposals and 
must be informed at least three days before the meeting (Article 28 par 5 of the Rules 
of Procedure). The Committee may also organize a hearing (Article 32 of the Rules of 
Procedure). 
39 Draft laws should be debated in plenary session no later than 30 days after the 
conclusions of the Leading Committee (Article 54 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure, 
some exceptions apply in cases of constitutional amendments and referendum). The 
Government may consider a draft law of high priority. Such a law must be debated 
and voted for within two months of the opening of the regular session (Article 51 
par 6 of the Rules of Procedure). The Government may generally determine the 
sequence of its draft legislation submitted to the National Assembly (Article 75 par 2 
of the Constitution). Priority decisions of the Government may trump the 30 days-rule 
of Article 54 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure, as this time limit only applies "if no 
other procedure is envisioned in the present law" (Article 54 par 1 of the Rules of 
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Procedure) – or in the Constitution. There is also a constitutional rule giving priority 
to the deliberation of laws remanded by the President (Article 72 par 2 of the 
Constitution). 
40 The first reading has the form of an initial debate and does not leave room for voting 
on individual articles; it is mainly a decision on whether the legislative process will 
continue or not. It begins with a report of the "author" - a Deputy (Article 50 par 2 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Article 55 par 5 of the Rules of Procedure), or a 
Government representative (Article 50 par 3b of the Rules of Procedure), also called 
"main speaker", followed by the report of the supplementary speaker, a representative 
of the Leading Committee (Article 55 par 5 of the Rules of Procedure), and possibly 
reports by representatives from other Committees (Article 55 par 5.1 of the Rules of 
Procedure), an exchange of opinions, final speeches of the supplementary speaker and 
main speaker, and a vote (Article 55 par 4 of the Rules of Procedure in conjunction 
with Article 64 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure). In his/her final speech, the main 
speaker (author) can either make changes to the draft law and propose to pass the law 
in second reading, or postpone the voting (Article 64 par 2 of the Rules of Procedure). 
In the latter case, the voting will be postponed until the end of the next three-day 
session in order to make the relevant amendments to the draft law or the package of 
drafts. If, after expiration of this time period, no such vote takes place, the law will be 
considered adopted without voting. The motion to pass the law in second reading or 
the proposal to postpone the voting must be supported by a majority of deputies 
participating in the voting (a quorum is reached by participation of half of the 
deputies) (Articles 71 of the Constitution and Article 60 par. 1 Rules of Procedure). 
2.5 Second Reading 
41 After the first reading, Government and Deputies may propose changes to the draft 
law within a period of 14 days. The proposals are addressed to the National Assembly 
staff, who within 24 hours forwards these proposals to the author of the draft law and 
the leading Committee (Article 66 par 2 of the Rules of Procedure). The author must 
create a list of proposals and add his or her opinion on them (information list). This 
list must be forwarded to the Leading Committee within 30 days (Article 67 par 1 of 
the Rule of Procedure), which will in turn form an opinion on the proposals. The 
Committee’s conclusions must be transmitted to the Chairperson of the National 
Assembly within a period of 14 days in order to schedule the second reading 
(Article 67 par 4 of the Rules of Procedure). On recommendation of the author of the 
draft law or the Leading Committee, the National Assembly may adjust the schedule 
(Article 67 par 5 of the Rules of Procedure). 
42 The second reading basically follows the rules of the first reading. Questions may be 
raised only by authors whose proposals were included in the information list (see 
Article 69 of the Rules of Procedure). First, the plenary votes on the whole text of the 
draft law (with those suggestions which the author deems acceptable). If this vote 
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fails, each proposal is voted and decided on separately (see Article 69 pars 5 and 6 of 
the Rule of Procedure10). 
43 However, there is at least one substantial exception: according to Article 75 par 2 of 
the Constitution the Government "may demand that [draft legislation is] voted only 
with amendments acceptable to it", as regards legislation proposed by the 
Government. 
2.6 Third Reading 
44 After the second reading, the draft law is edited by the author and the Leading 
Committee within 30 days; changes in substance are not permissible (Article 71 par 1 
of the Rule of Procedure). The edited text along with an information list outlining the 
changes made is presented to the Chairperson of the National Assembly and put to a 
third and final vote in the National Assembly (Article 72 of the Rules of Procedure); a 
debate on individual provisions is not possible. However, the author of the law may 
take the draft law back to the stage of the second reading and prepare a new 
information list if it fails to receive the necessary votes for adoption. If not, the draft 
law is rejected and removed from circulation (Article 72 par 4 of the Rules of 
Procedure) 
2.7 Presidential Veto 
45 The adopted law is transmitted to the President within ten days (Article 72 par 5 of the 
Rules of Procedure). Within 21 days (Article 55 par 2 of the Constitution; Article 72 
par 5 of the Rules of Procedure) the President signs the law or remands it with 
objections and recommendations to the National Assembly. 
46 Remanded laws must be deliberated in the National Assembly as a priority (Article 72 
par 2 of the Constitution); they shall be "included in the agendas of the regular series 
of sessions and the pending four-day sittings and be put to extraordinary debate" 
(Article 73 par 1 of the Rules of Procedure). Members of the National Assembly may 
propose changes connected to the presidential recommendations (Article 73 par 1 of 
the Rules of Procedure). The procedure follows the rules of the first reading of a draft 
law, except that a representative of the President now acts as the main speaker of the 
law (Article 73 par 3 of the Rules of Procedure); only the presidential representative 
may allow changes to the presidential amendments. If the presidential version of the 
law fails to gather the necessary votes, the National Assembly may adopt the law in its 
original version (Article 73 par 8 of the Rules of Procedure). The presidential veto 
thus has only delaying effect. The National Assembly may pass the law again with a 
majority of votes in the National Assembly, provided that more than half of the total 
number of Deputies has participated in voting (Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution) 
– this is the generally applicable voting mode in the National Assembly (Article 60 
                                           
10
 The wording of this provision appears to be difficult for understanding, although the difficulty may stem 
from the translation 
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par 1 of the Rules of Procedure). A re-adopted law must be signed by the President 
within five days (Article 55 par 2 of the Constitution, Article 73 par 8 of the Rules of 
Procedure). 
2.8 Referendum 
47 Laws may be subjected to popular referendum. A referendum on a law can be initiated 
by the National Assembly or by the Government (Article 112 par 1 of the Constitution 
and Article 8 par 1 of the Law on Referendum) – but not by the President.  
48 The Government may introduce a referendum on its own legislation only with the 
consent of the National Assembly; Article 8 par 5 of the Law on Referendum speaks 
of "approval of the National Assembly": "[w]ithin two days after receiving the draft 
law introduced by the Government, the President of the Republic introduces the draft 
to the National Assembly to receive the approval of the National Assembly to submit 
it to referendum.". There is no reciprocal requirement that a call for a referendum by 
the National Assembly requires the consent of the Government. 
49 Time-wise, the referendum is possible after "approving the draft law according to the 
Law of the Republic of Armenia’s 'National Assembly Rules of Procedure'" (Article 8 
par 2 of the Law on Referendum), by the National Assembly. In case of a presidential 
veto, the National Assembly may even "approve" the law after such a veto has been 
declared. However, the procedure provided for in Article 8 pars 3-6 of the Law on 
Referendum appears to be similar to the one of the general presidential veto against 
draft laws (see supra pars 45-46), which indicates that a decision of the National 
Assembly on a referendum may only take place after the third reading of the law, but 
not on a law remanded by the President. 
50 A referendum requires the majority vote of the total number of Deputies (Articles 111 
par 2 and 112 par 1 of the Constitution). A law submitted for referendum to the 
President may be remanded by the President for reexamination within 21 days 
(Article 8 par 3 of the Law on Referendum). The National Assembly may insist on a 
referendum by two thirds of the total number of Deputies of the National Assembly 
(Article 8 par 4 of the Law on Referendum). 
51 The referendum has to be called by the President within 21 days after the National 
Assembly has requested, approved or confirmed the referendum (Article 8 par 7 of the 
Law on Referendum). It shall take place not earlier than 45 days and not later than 60 
days after the publication of the President's decree; the law must be published at least 
30 days before the referendum takes place (Article 8 pars 8 and 9 of the Law on 
Referendum). 
52 The referendum process is mainly in the hand of special commissions (see Articles 9-
16 of the Law on Referendum).The political process preceding the vote is reserved to 
citizens, parties and non-governmental unions (Article 20 par 1 of the Law on 
Referendum). They may also observe the voting process, together with international 
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organizations, representatives of foreign countries and NGOs (Article 22 of the Law 
on Referendum). Campaigning of government entities is prohibited (Article 20 par 5 
of the Law on Referendum). 
53 A draft law passes the referendum when it receives over 50% of the votes by more 
than one fourth of the registered voters (Article 113 of the Constitution). The outcome 
of the referendum is subject to appeal to the Constitutional Court (Article 100 par 3 of 
the Constitution). 
2.9 Publication 
54 A new law is published by the President (Article 55 par 2 of the Constitution, 
Article 73 par 8 of the Rules of Procedure). Publication is mandatory (Article 48 par 1 
of the Law on Legal Acts). New laws are to be found in the Official Bulletin (see 
Articles 62 and 64 of the Law on Legal Acts for details). 
55 A law comes into force as specified therein (Article 48 par 2 of the Law on Legal 
Acts) or, if such a provision missing, 10 days after publication if the law concerns 
obligations and status of legal and natural persons (Article 46 par 2 subpar 3 of the 
Law on Legal Acts). 
2.10 Judicial Review 
56 Adopted laws are subject to judicial review. The Constitutional Court determines the 
compliance of laws with the Constitution (Article 100 par 1 of the Constitution).  The 
Constitutional Court provides for constitutional review of the law itself ("abstract 
review") as well as for the law applied in a specific case. The former process shall be 
initiated by state bodies, the latter is open to private parties (Law of the Republic of 
Armenia on the Constitutional Court of June 1, 2006 (hereafter, "the Law on the 
Constitutional Court"), see especially Articles 68-69.). 
57 Articles 100 and 101 of the Constitution envisage that the abstract review of laws can 
be initiated – inter alia – by the President, one-fifth of the deputies of the National 
Assembly, the Government, and the Human Rights' Defender concerning laws 
allegedly infringing human rights. Article 68 par 7 of the Law on the Constitutional 
Court provides for some guidance as to how the Constitutional Court should approach 
these cases, such as considering the time of adoption, the necessity of the protection of 
fundamental rights, the principle of separation of powers, or the necessity of ensuring 
the direct application of the Constitution. Article 86 of the Law on Legal Acts, which 
concerns the interpretation of a legal act, also applies. The Constitutional Court may 
invalidate the challenged law or parts of the law (see Article 68 par 8 subpar 2 of the 
Law on the Constitutional Court). In case of invalidation, Article 68 par 10 of the Law 
on the Constitutional Court provides that individual acts based on that law shall 
remain in force; however, acts on criminal sanctions and administrative liability 
matters may be revisited (Article 68 par 13 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). 
Article 102 pars 2 and 3 of the Constitution state that invalidation enters into force 
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immediately after the Constitutional Court decision but also that this may be 
postponed if severe consequences are expected for the public (see Article 68 pars 15-
17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court for details).  
58 A review of the constitutionality of laws, when applied in a specific case, may be 
initiated not only by the aforementioned state institutions (Article 68 par 1 of the Law 
on the Constitutional Court) but also by citizens: an application to the Constitutional 
Court may be lodged by "every person in a specific case when the final judicial act has 
been adopted, when the possibilities of judicial protection have been exhausted and 
when the constitutionality of a law provision applied by the act in question is being 
challenged" (Article 101 par 6 of the Constitution). Such a complaint must be 
submitted to the Constitutional Court no later than six months after the exhaustion of 
all other legal remedies (Article 69 par 5 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). The 
National Assembly acts as respondent as the body that adopted the disputed legal act 
in such proceedings (Article 69 par 3 Law on the Constitutional Court).  
59 In the case of individual complaints, the proceedings start with an admission 
procedure (Article 69 pars 6-10 of the Law on the Constitutional Court; see also 
Articles 30-32 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). The procedure before the 
Constitutional Court is regulated in Articles 35-67 of the Law on the Constitutional 
Court. Parties have access to the Constitutional Court's material regarding the case 
(Article 47 par 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). Hearings are public 
(Article 22 of the Law on the Constitutional Court), with some limited exceptions 
(Article 22 par 3 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). 
60 The examination by the Constitutional Court clearly includes a review of basic legal 
principles as well as fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (see 
Articles 1-44 of the Constitution). A law which is inconsistent with these 
constitutional rights will thus be declared wholly or partly invalid. However, it is less 
clear whether infringements of one law by another law may also lead to invalidation. 
Such a conflict may especially arise with respect to the many rules in the Law on 
Legal Acts. One may argue that the rule of law (Article 1 of the Constitution) 
implicates such a comparative legal review; especially as many important aspects of 
legality are encompassed in the Law on Legal Acts, such as the hierarchy of norms or 
the delegation of legislative powers (see supra par 14). However, the obligation to 
review a law with respect to all existing legislation may open a wide field of 
legislation for invalidation, especially as, in case of conflicting legislation, legislation 
passed earlier prevails over newer legislation (Article 24 par 3 of the Law on Legal 
Acts). 
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3. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE CONSTITUTION, SECONDARY 
LEGISLATION, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
3.1 The Constitution 
61 Revision of the Constitution requires a referendum which may be initiated by the 
President or the National Assembly (Article 111 par 1 of the Constitution). The 
processes for the adoption of a completely new constitution and for constitutional 
amendments are practically identical. The process is likewise similar to the one for 
referendum on laws (see supra pars. 47-53). 
62 As with the process for laws, the President may veto and remand a draft constitutional 
provision to the National Assembly (Article 111 pars 2 and 3 of the Constitution); his 
or her veto may be overcome by the National Assembly by two thirds of the total 
number of members of the National Assembly (Article 111 par 4 of the Constitution, 
see also supra pars 45-46). Proposals of the President require the majority of the total 
numbers of members of the National Assembly before they may be submitted to a 
referendum (Article 111 par 5 of the Constitution). 
63 Article 1 (rule of law), Article 2 (democracy) and Article 114 (safeguarding provision) 
of the Constitution are exempt from any possible revision (Article 114 of the 
Constitution and Article 4 par 2a of the Law on Referendum). Article 4 pars 2b-2c of 
the Law on Referendum extend this restriction to " issues of prolonging or reducing 
the powers of incumbent President and incumbent National Assembly as well as 
incumbent state and local self-governing bodies" and to " issues related to human and 
citizens' rights, freedoms and obligations, the elimination or restriction of 
constitutional guarantees providing their implementation, as well as issues directly 
bestowed to the exclusive competence of state and local self-governing bodies." 
3.2 Secondary Legislation 
64 The National Assembly, the President, the Government and other state bodies may 
adopt normative legal acts, i.e. regulation on the sub-legislative level. Such regulation 
must not concern areas which are reserved to primary laws (Article 9 par 4 of the Law 
on Legal Acts); it has to remain "within the limits expressly provided for by law" and 
may not contain additional restrictions of rights of natural persons or contain 
additional obligations. 
65 Apart from laws, the National Assembly may pass resolutions (Article 4 par 1 and 
Article 12 of the Law on Legal Acts). In contrast, regulations passed by the President 
have the form of a decree (Article 56 of the Constitution and Article 13 par 4 of the 
Law on Legal Acts), while regulations passed by the Government are issued in the 
form of resolutions (Article 14 par 4 of the Law on Legal Acts). In the legal hierarchy, 
decrees may not contradict laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, while 
resolutions of the Government may not contradict laws passed by referendum, other 
laws, resolutions of the National Assembly and decrees of the President (Articles 12-
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14 of the Law on Legal Acts). This leads to the following top to bottom hierarchy: the 
Constitution, laws passed by referendum, laws, resolutions of the National Assembly, 
decrees of the President, and resolutions of the Government. 
3.3 International Treaties 
66 The President is responsible for international relations (Article 55 par 7 of the 
Constitution). He/she recommends international treaties for ratification to the National 
Assembly (Article 81 par 2 of the Constitution). Ratification by the National 
Assembly is required for treaties, that "are of political or military nature or stipulate 
changes of the state borders", "relate to human rights, freedoms and obligations, 
"stipulate financial commitments for the Republic of Armenia", or lead to legislative 
activity (Article 81 pars 2a-2d of the Constitution). Other agreements can be directly 
concluded by the President (Article 55 par 7 of the Constitution). 
67 International treaties, as well as customary international law, are directly applicable 
legal sources in Armenia (Article 21 par 2 of the Law on Legal Acts). In the hierarchy 
of laws, international treaties have the same level as other legal acts issued by the 
body signing or ratifying the treaty in question (Article 21 par 4 subpar 1 of the Law 
on Legal Acts). In case of conflict between a national and the international rule 
adopted by the same body, international law prevails (Article 21 par 4 subpars 2 and 3 
of the Law on Legal Acts). 
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ANNEX 2: THE BASIS FOR OSCE/ODIHR’S LAWMAKING REFORM 
ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES 
In the transition countries11, efforts to improve the quality and the effectiveness of their 
legislation have been assisted in a sporadic and fragmentary manner with a variety of 
understandings of the notions involved, and a wide typology of activities associated with 
these notions. Little work was done in terms of methods for supporting these efforts, whilst 
considerable resources have been devoted to the building or strengthening of institutions 
involved in law-making.  The most comprehensive attempt to take stock of law drafting 
practices in selected countries and to point out crucial issues to be considered when creating 
or reviewing regulations on law drafting was conducted under the SIGMA programme12, a 
joint initiative of the European Union and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development13. Created in 1992 with a focus on EU candidate countries14, this programme 
has provided support to decision-makers and public administrations in their efforts to 
modernize “public governance systems.” Within this overall framework, a project aimed at 
helping the countries to improve their law drafting methodology and techniques was launched 
in 199615. Efforts to improve the quality and the effectiveness of legislation have also been 
supported, though on a lesser scale, by the Council of Europe’s Law-making Project16.  
For long, the primary focus of OSCE/ODIHR’s assistance was on providing ad hoc legal 
advice on individual pieces of legislation, when the process of their drafting and consideration 
was ongoing. While doing so, OSCE/ODIHR recurrently noted that some of the shortcomings 
identified in the texts found their cause in the manner in which the legislative process was 
managed or regulated. Therefore, specific recommendations related to procedural matters, 
including mechanisms for making the process more transparent and more inclusive or for 
monitoring the implementation of legislation, have been made to the legislators with varying 
degree of success. Experience has shown that the most effective laws are the result of a 
legislative process, which is managed in its entirety, operates on the basis of a set of 
comprehensive, uniform and coherent rules,  and allows for consultations with those to be 
                                           
11
 The term “transition country’ broadly refers here to countries undergoing a comprehensive process of 
political and/or economical transformation. 
12
 SIGMA – Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern Europe. 
13
 For more information on this programme, refer to: 
https://www.oecd.org/pages/0,2966,en_33638100_33638151_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 15 March 
2006) 
14
 Ten of the countries with which SIGMA has been working on law drafting and regulatory management issues 
since 1996 are now EU Member States. Since 2001 the Programme has been assisting countries of the 
Western Balkans in building their public institutions and systems in the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) agreed with the EU. 
15
 SIGMA Paper No 18, Law Drafting and Regulatory Management in Central and Eastern Europe (1997) - 
OECD. 
16
 For more information on this project, refer to: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Law_making/ (last visited 15 March 2006) 
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affected by the legislation or responsible for its proper enforcement. There was an obvious 
need to look beyond individual pieces of legislation and interview those involved in the 
process with a view to getting an overall picture of a particular country’s entire legislative 
process, including the structure and interaction of the institutions involved. In this endeavour, 
particular attention was to be given to the concept of ‘legislative transparency’, which is 
specifically referred to in two key OSCE documents17, and to take into consideration 
recommendations or special interests manifested in discussions that took place in OSCE 
Human Dimension Implementation Meetings in 2002, 2003 and 2004 as well as at the 2004 
Human Dimension Seminar on Democratic Governance. Among these recommendations, it is 
worth recalling the following18:  
a. Access to laws and legislative documents, including primary and secondary 
legislation, court rulings, draft laws and legislative agendas, should be ensured. 
b. Legislative proceedings should be open to the public.  
c. Legislative transparency should be fostered at all levels of governance, 
including local self-governance. 
d. Public consultation should be an indispensable element of legislative process.  
Both legislatures and the executive branch should encourage public 
consultation.   
e. Parliamentary proceedings, including committees meetings, should be open to 
the public. 
f. Minutes and records should be entirely available to the public. Reading rooms 
and internet could be used to this end. 
g. The ODIHR’s legislative assistance work should pay greater attention to the 
underlying attitudes and factors that affect the way laws are prepared and 
drafted and should place more emphasis on promoting citizen participation in 
the political process besides elections.   
h. The OSCE’s work with legislatures should be expanded.  An inventory of 
standards related to structures, procedures and practices of democratic 
parliaments should be developed. 
i. To promote strengthening of democratic practices within parliaments of the 
                                           
17
 Among those elements of justice that are essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of human beings are (…) legislation, adopted at the end of a public procedure, 
and regulations that will be published, that being the conditions of their applicability. Those texts will be 
accessible to everyone;” (paragraph 5.8,   Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the 
Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990). “Legislation will be formulated and adopted as the result of an open 
process reflecting the will of the people, either directly or through their elected representatives” (paragraph 
18.1, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991). 
18
 These recommendations are extracted from the original documents. 
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participating States, the OSCE should assist with the development of rules of 
procedure and legal frameworks. 
j. The ODIHR should provide assistance to participating States with regard to 
law drafting in a decentralized state structure, with focus on specifics of 
enforceability issues at the local level. 
The purpose of a comprehensive assessment of the lawmaking system assessment is to 
collect, synthesize and analyze information with sufficient objectivity and detail to support 
credible recommendations for reform in the area in question. Information for the assessment 
is collected through semi-structured field interviews with pre-identified interlocutors, as well 
as through compiling relevant domestic legislation and regulations.  The field interviews are 
preceded by the sending out of questionnaires to the intended interlocutors in order to provide 
a better overview of the purpose and scope of the visit and to allow time for preparation.  The 
interviews aim at gathering information on the procedures and practices in place, as well as on 
the international assistance efforts in this and related areas. 
The information gathered through field interviews and the collection of domestic laws and 
regulations is then analyzed in the light of generally accepted international standards in 
relation to legislation. There are two types of standard in particular which are relevant to the 
current assessment: ‘system standards’, i.e. the standards expected of law making systems, 
and ‘standards for regulatory instruments’, i.e. the standards expected of individual legislative 
instruments themselves. The former encompass:  
• Coherence, consistency and balance between competing policies; 
• Stability and predictability of regulatory requirements; 
• Ease of management and oversight, and responsiveness to political direction; 
• Transparency and openness to the political level and to the public;  
• Consistency, fairness and due process in implementation;  
• Adaptation to changing circumstances.   
 
The latter encompass: 
• user standards, e.g. clarity, simplicity and accessibility for private citizens;  
• design standards, e.g. flexibility and consistency with other rules and international 
standards;  
• legal standards, e.g. structure, orderliness, clear drafting and terminology, and the 
existence of clear legal authority for action;  
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• effectiveness standards, e.g. relevance to clearly defined problems and real-world 
conditions;  
• economic and analytical standards, e.g. benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness; 
measurement of impacts on business, competitiveness and trade; 
• implementation standards, e.g. practicability, feasibility, enforceability, public 
acceptance and availability of necessary resources.  
 
 
